Introduction
The 2024 US Presidential Election faces significant threats from nation-state cyber actors, particularly those linked to the Iranian Government’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) [2]. Intelligence officials have identified foreign adversaries, including Russia [3], Iran [3], and China [3], as potential disruptors of the electoral process through tactics aimed at undermining the integrity of election results.
Description
Nation-state cyber actors [1], particularly those affiliated with the Iranian Government’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) [2], are anticipated to pose significant threats to the 2024 US Presidential Election [1]. Intelligence officials warn that foreign rivals, including Russia [3], Iran [3], and China [3], are expected to employ tactics aimed at undermining the integrity of the election results [3]. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has identified heightened risks surrounding the election cycle [4], with foreign adversaries and domestic extremist groups increasingly targeting the electoral process [4]. These actors are expected to amplify false claims and disinformation to cast doubt on the election outcomes [3], particularly in a potentially contested atmosphere between former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris.
Iranian operatives have been charged with hacking activities intended to disrupt the election [3], including breaching the email accounts of Trump campaign staff [3]. Additionally, Russia [3], China [3], and Cuba are reportedly attempting to influence select congressional races to support candidates aligned with their geopolitical interests [3]. For instance, Moscow favors candidates opposed to increased aid to Ukraine [3], while Beijing supports those advocating for its claims over Taiwan [3]. Cuba is focusing on issues like trade embargoes and travel restrictions [3], particularly targeting the Latino population and Spanish-speaking voters in Florida [3].
These actors are expected to employ social engineering techniques through email and chat applications to disseminate material that undermines election candidates and government officials, thereby exacerbating societal divisions and creating discord among citizens [1]. Misinformation campaigns aimed at specific voter demographics are also being utilized to undermine public confidence in the electoral process [4]. Their primary targets will include individuals associated with national political organizations [2], government entities [1], election-related networks [1], political parties at both national and local levels [1], and the personal devices of election officials [1].
Concerns have been raised about the security of election infrastructure and voter registration databases [4], although there is currently no evidence of foreign interference successfully disrupting election results [4]. The evolving AI landscape will likely be exploited by these actors to manipulate voting behavior in alignment with their interests [1]. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) has provided campaigns with defensive briefings regarding these malign influence efforts [3], significantly increasing the number of briefings compared to previous election cycles [3]. Additionally, the potential for domestic extremist violence remains significant [4], highlighting the need for vigilance among election officials and the public as election day approaches.
To mitigate these threats [2], it is crucial for individuals and organizations involved in national political campaigns to adopt best practices, such as keeping applications and operating systems updated [2], training staff to use only official accounts for business communications [2], and implementing phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (MFA) [2]. State officials have reported insufficient federal funding for election cybersecurity [4], particularly in the critical weeks leading up to the election [4]. The ongoing and escalating risk from IRGC cyber actors necessitates proactive measures to enhance security and resilience during this pivotal period, ensuring the safety of government officials [4], voters [3] [4], and election personnel while protecting democratic processes in the United States.
Conclusion
The potential threats to the 2024 US Presidential Election from foreign cyber actors underscore the need for heightened vigilance and robust cybersecurity measures. Mitigating these risks requires coordinated efforts from government agencies, political organizations [2], and the public to safeguard the electoral process. As the election approaches [4], the focus must remain on enhancing security protocols, ensuring adequate funding, and fostering public awareness to protect the integrity of democratic institutions.
References
[1] https://www.cybersecurityintelligence.com/blog/2024-us-presidential-election-part-2—hostile-nation-state-actors–7972.html
[2] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cisa-and-fbi-warn-iranian-backed-cyber-activity-undermine-us-democratic-institutions
[3] https://www.nextgov.com/cybersecurity/2024/10/foreign-adversaries-will-aim-discredit-results-after-election-day-intel-officials-warn/400127/
[4] https://cybermaterial.com/dhs-warns-election-risks-may-extend-to-2025/
